There is overwhelming empirical evidence that the rights and wellbeing of children incarcerated in penal institutions in England and Wales are inadequately protected, despite some significant rights-based litigation taken by detained children and their advocates. The removal of criminal legal aid from all prisoners, including children, and the potential future repeal of the Human Rights Act will further increase their vulnerability to rights-abuses. This article argues that that one solution to this current legal problem is to abolish penal institutions for children sentenced to custody and to place them instead in care-based homes. A rights-based case is made for this solution by conceptualising the rights of incarcerated children to argue that the State has an assumed responsibility to parent children deprived of their liberty; a responsibility that can be met only in small, care-based homes. The article concludes by setting out the Coalition Government's recent proposals to introduce Secure Colleges in the juvenile secure estate, and briefly considers whether these new institutions will facilitate the State's fulfilment of its assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated children.
individual redress, they have so far proved unsuccessful in securing the type of systemic or structural change necessary for the juvenile secure estate to be more rights-consistent overall. Specifically, rights-based litigation has not led to the abolition of the type of institution that is most harmful to children: the YOI. Thus, prison-type accommodation continues to dominate the landscape of the juvenile secure estate. In section three I explain why this is a particularly current problem, pointing to changes in the legal environment -including legal aid reform and the potential repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 -which will make it more difficult for children detained in YOIs to seek legal advice and remedies in relation to their treatment therein. In section four I conceptualise the rights of incarcerated children and from here I argue that detained minors have a right to be placed in a care based home. This right derives from the State's assumed responsibility to parent children deprived of their liberty; a responsibility that cannot be met within YOIs but which instead requires the use of small, care-based homes. My argument therefore provides the necessary conceptual basis to support the claims of other scholars and children's rights advocates that children should be removed from prison-type penal accommodation. I conclude the article by setting out the Coalition Government's recent proposals to replace YOIs and STCs with Secure Colleges, and briefly consider whether these new institutions will facilitate the State's fulfilment of its assumed responsibility to incarcerated children.
The Nature of the Current Legal Problem: The Experiences of Children in the Juvenile Secure Estate
It is not the purpose of this article to conduct a rights-audit of the juvenile secure estate in England and Wales. 9 Nonetheless, it is helpful to set out some of the qualitative and quantitative data on children's experiences of carceral institutions in order to provide the empirical context for the legal and conceptual arguments that welfare or wellbeing 12 -the juvenile secure estate in England and Wales does not fare well. 13 First, children die in detention, 14 mostly as a result of suicide or self-harmrates of which are generally high across the secure estate 15 -and on occasion death occurs after the use of restraint or at the hands of another child. 16 33 Thirty-three children died in the secure estate between 1990 and 2012 including three between 2011-12. 17 The inquests and investigations into these deaths reveal that the children who died were 'often very vulnerable and none received the level of support and protection they needed'. 18 Secondly, children in the secure estate are subject to physical and psychological harm or intrusion from those who are charged with their care. This is most clearly the case when children are subject to restraint, which sometimes involves 10 In particular see . Taken together, these standards set out the overarching principle that children deprived of their liberty should be treated in accordance with their inherent dignity and humanity. 11 In particular, Articles 2, 3, and 8. The domestic courts draw on the UNCRC to interpret the ECHR for children, and thus sometimes the threshold for engagement is lower, and what is proportionate differs. See ZH (Tanzania) 12 What is meant by wellbeing or welfare is fairly nebulous and context dependent. Every Child Matters set out five outcomes: be healthy; stay safe; enjoy and achieve; make a positive contribution; active economic wellbeing. These criteria are reflected in the definition of wellbeing in the Children Act 2004, s 10(2). 13 For . 16 Gareth Myatt and Chris Greenaway respectively: Inquest (n 14). 17 Inquest (n 14). 18 As reported by Prison Reform Trust/Inquest (n 1) 1.
as Andrew Neilsen noted, that on their first day in custody vulnerable children, some of whom will have been victims of sexual abuse, were required to undress in front of two adults.
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Thirdly and more generally, children experience penal institutions as violent and harsh. This is partly due to the physical environment, particularly when children are placed in segregation units where they may not receive education or purposeful activity and sometimes have little time outside of their cell. 25 Despite the drop in the custody rate, some institutions now rely to an even greater extent on segregation.
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Violence can also come from other young people, and in some institutions children experience a great deal of assault and bullying. 27 The distance of many incarcerated 
Different Institutions, Different Experiences
The picture, therefore, is bleak, and it is also complex. 48 'Vulnerability' is no longer explicitly used to structure placement decisions but the relevant factors map on to the concept nonetheless. These are the child's welfare as 'a priority', risk factors, risk of harm to the child herself and to others, previous history in the secure estate, specific needs, codefendant/gang related issues, and the availability of beds: see https://www.justice.gov.uk/youthjustice/custody/placing-young-people-in-custody/placement-decisions-and-reviews <accessed 18 July 2014>. 49 The average place costs £215,000 per year in an SCH, £160,00 in an STC, and £60,000 in a YOI. as not vulnerable even though they are likely to have suffered earlier disadvantage and be very troubled. 59 Secondly, these cases suggest that the ECHR is of limited utility in challenging placement decisions because the content of the rights is narrowly construed and the threshold for engagement high. The apparent rightscompatibility that is thus implied not only deprives the child of a remedy but also confers a legitimacy on YOIs that the empirical evidence suggests is absent.
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Legal challenges that have been more systemic in nature and aimed either directly at the lack of SCH places (the commissioning of beds by the YJB) or indirectly (the criteria used for prioritisation between groups) have similarly been unsuccessful on rights-based grounds. In SR again, it was argued that the statutory framework that then governed remand was discriminatory in favour of girls. At that time, all girls aged 12-16 were remanded to local authority care and 15-16 year old boys were placed in an STC or YOI unless they could show they were vulnerable 'by reason of his physical or emotional immaturity or a propensity of his to harm himself'
(and a place was available). 61 The court held that the statutory framework was discriminatory but this was justified because otherwise older girls would be held either in adult prisons or a long distance from home in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
The court dismissed an argument made by SR's counsel that the lack of available places in SCHs sufficient to accommodate all vulnerable children of both genders had resulted partly from legislative changes that led to an increase in the number of younger children being placed on remand (thus taking up the available SCH beds).
Lord Justice Brooke stated that '[i]n a democratic society, if our elected representatives believe that it is desirable or expedient to detain more children, and younger children, in secure accommodation than was previously thought desirable or expedient, that is a choice they are entitled to make'.
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The court was similarly unwilling to overstep its institutional limits in R (on Only children who are sufficiently vulnerable are placed in SCHs; a welfarist rather than a rights-based approach. 69 Thus the continued use of YOIs for the under 18s remains lawful and the courts instead expect children whose rights (legal or human) have been or might be infringed within a YOI to litigate individually. However, doing so depends on having access to a system of law that is able to protect those 64 The best interests provision and the obligation on states to ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child. 65 Secure Services (n 50) [112] . 66 ibid [111] . 67 SR (n 11). 68 Secure Services (n 50) [111] . 69 'Both rights and needs amount to a demand that certain interests be attended to; but only rights-talk presents those interests in the voice of one who would be a fully-fledged member of society, who is not going to go away, and who expects to be taken seriously as an enduring source of continuing demands'.
rights, something which recent and proposed legal developments are likely to undermine.
The Current Legal Problem: Incarcerated Children and Access to Justice
The potential and actual threats, to access to justice for incarcerated children come from two sources: reform to the system of legal aid and the future repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Legal Aid Reform
The first and so far most significant limitation to access to justice for incarcerated children results from the 2013 legal aid reforms. 70 For prisoners of any age, criminal legal aid is now restricted to 'liberty cases', 71 meaning that for most detained children (who lack access to their own financial arrangements) legal advice and representation in relation to treatment and sentencing matters will no longer be available. Secondly, there are specific legal issues at stake for children in and leaving custody that are unlikely to be resolved without legal advice. 76 A key matter is children's resettlement and the use of the Children Act 1989 to secure local authority support when the child leaves custody. Given (amongst other things) the complexity of the statutory eligibility criteria, detained children are unlikely to realise that upon leaving custody they may become a 'child in need' or a 'care leaver' under the Children Act 1989, and that such a status imposes significant duties on local authorities (which can include, for example, a duty to provide accommodation).
Furthermore, even if a child has the requisite knowledge, the primary mechanism available for seeking redress -the prison internal complaints systems -relates only to the duties of the penal institution and provides no remedy against a local authority.
Thirdly, like adult prisoners, detained children cannot access free sources of legal advice such as the Citizens' Advice Bureau and, as Evans notes, there is limited and highly controlled access to legal sources on the internet. 77 Moreover, numerous studies show that children in prison are more likely to have low literacy skills, low IQ, special educational needs, and low educational achievement, which means that their capacities necessary to articulate a complaint, and to understand the legal issues at stake, may be lacking. 78 Many detained children are simply not equipped to act on their own behalf.
79 74 Jacobson and others (n 32). 75 On which see the discussion in section four below. 76 The same is true in relation to liberty cases, where the effect of a short extension to a child's sentence following a disciplinary hearing can have long term consequences in terms of the duties owed to him by the local authority, if the effect is to disqualify the child from 'care-leaver' status. including the substantive issue that the reforms restricted access to justice in contravention with the common law and Article 6 ECHR. 87 There was no discussion in the judgment of the specific impact on children and for the time being the regulations remain in place. 88 Thus, instead of having access to lawyers for advice regarding their treatment in detention, as noted, children are expected to rely on internal prisons complaints systems, complaints to the Prisons and Probation
Ombudsman, and judicial review. In addition to the limitations of internal complaints mechanisms that have already been outlined, judicial review also fails to provide a suitable alternative because of the strict time limits to bring a claim (three months), the requirement that children have a litigation friend, and because firms with judicial review legal aid contracts are limited in the number of cases they can bring a year ('matter starts'), making it difficult for them to absorb additional prison-related cases into their workload. 89 None of the alternatives to criminal legal aid are therefore sufficient.
Human Rights Act 1998: RIP?
The second (potential) limit to access to justice for detained children arises if the Conservative Party are elected with a majority in 2015 and repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). 90 Although, as noted above, the common law has been of greater utility to incarcerated children than the ECHR, where HRA challenges have been successful the impact has been significant. 91 In addition, the availability of the HRA as the basis for litigating rights has a wider, indirect effect. Whitty has argued that even though prison environments may not be 'saturated with rights discourses' and even though judges are not inevitably the 'defenders of prisoners' rights', the increase in human-rights based litigation, even when it is unsuccessful, has had an important systemic impact by increasing and broadening the scope of legal risk within the prison 
Conceptualising Children's Citizenship
Citizenship is a highly contested concept but at its core it denotes community membership and equality in civic participation. 103 It is a concept that carries
importance because of what it signifies about inclusion/exclusion and because of its relationship to the formal attribution of rights. 104 It implies (legally and culturally) equality, belonging, value, and reciprocal responsibilities; it confers a status that determines the rights and worth of groups and individuals within that community. It is for this reason that some traditional ideas of citizenship are criticised for privileging the position and experience of particular groups and conferring on them the status of 'citizen' to the exclusion of others. 105 This is most clearly the case in relation to the 'core' meaning of citizenship as political citizenship, which denies membership to those -including children -who cannot vote or stand for public office. 106 It is evident too in extended versions of citizenship, including TH Marshall's classic tripartite articulation of civil, political, and social citizenship rights, 107 where the position of children as 'partial' or 'demi-citizens' is further entrenched by the broadening of the conditions of 'full' membership. 108 One response to the exclusion of children from many aspects of citizenship has been to redefine the concept to take account of their own experiences and understandings of its meaning. Ruth Lister, for example, highlights the centrality to children of citizenship as the fulfilment of obligations and responsibilities. 109 And, when understood as 'citizenship in practice', the many contributions that children make to public life (for example through formal structures such as youth councils, via proxies, during collective consultation processes, and in everyday activities in public spaces such as schools 110 ) can evidence children's citizenship and strengthen their claims to 'insider' status. 111 However, this type of extended cultural definition can conceal important age-based differences that affect how children enjoy the benefits and are able to meet the obligations of citizenship. 112 It also obscures a point I will return to below: restrictions on children's political and social citizenship mean that conceptually (and, for many, empirically 113 ) children's lives are lived in the private sphere to a much greater degree than are the lives of adults.
Within the criminal justice context it is particularly important not to mask children's exclusion from many of the core elements of political and social citizenship by adopting a 'difference-centred' 114 or cultural approach to citizenship. A more inclusive definition of citizenship can be (mis)appropriated -as it was by New Labour -to defend the subjection of young children to accountability before the criminal courts. 115 A narrower, liberal rights-based approach to citizenship that highlights children's exclusion is taken here because it is within the space between partial and full citizenship that the State's obligation to provide differential and special treatment to incarcerated children emerges and provides the basis for normative rights-claims that are not dependent on empirically determined and individually variable characteristics.
Citizenship and Incarceration
I focus on citizenship because my starting point when thinking about criminal responsibility is that we are held accountable as citizens for engaging in behaviour that has been politically defined as a public wrong. 116 The importance of highlighting the 'political character of crime' 117 -that crime and criminal justice systems exist solely within political systems -is that it draws attention not only to the responsibility that is owed by us but also the responsibility owed to us by the political community (represented by the State) that is calling us to account. 118 Reciprocity is therefore central to the criminal responsibility of citizens. 119 There are multiple ways in which this reciprocity can be manifested within a system of criminal justice. For example, for Duff it gives rise to a 'moral bar to trial' if an individual or group has been legally and effectively excluded from the benefits of citizenship; 120 or it can be used to further support the idea of a 'hardship defence'; 121 it might inform sentencing; 122 or it could be translated into a reparatory obligation to redress the 'secondary pains of punishment'. 123 The particular focus here is narrower; it considers the significance of reciprocity for one particular group: children deprived of their liberty.
Historically, the reciprocity in the relationship between prisoners and the state was, in citizenship terms, typically conceptualised as absent: incarceration constituted 'civic death'. 124 However, even during the nineteenth century, prisons were locations to reform and 'mould' citizens who remained partially within the political community, 125 at least in contrast to the completely exclusionary forms of punishment that went before. 126 Vaughan has thus described prisoners as 'conditional citizens' who exist in a liminal state between inclusion and exclusion:
The relationship between punishment and citizenship is then conditional in two senses: the first is that one's claim to citizenship is granted only if one abides by an accepted standard of behavior and punishment may be imposed if one does not live up to this standard; second, while undergoing this punishment, one is no longer a full citizen yet neither is one completely rejected. Instead one occupies the purgatory of being a 'conditional citizen'. But what is not captured by this citizenship analysis of prisoners' rights is how, conceptually, children already exist in a liminal place between inclusion and exclusion: they may become conditional citizens when they are incarcerated but they also enter prison as partial citizens. This must also be taken into account in order to understand the rights of detained children.
Taking Account of Children's Citizenship: The Right to be Parented
The differential status of children qua citizens, and the relevance this has to their rights when incarcerated, is properly taken into account when it is recognised that the space between children's partial citizenship and the full citizenship rights enjoyed by adults is not a void; it is filled by the duties that parents have to their children. Even the decision to allow them to remain 'private' -that is, left in the hands of mothers, fathers, and individual citizens -is ultimately a political one.
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The obligation on parents to protect the 'private' rights of children is the quid pro quo of family privacy: the state does not interfere in the upbringing of children provided certain minimum standards are met. emotions (which include attachment, being able to give and receive love and care,
'not having one's emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety') and (ii) affiliation (being able to live with and toward others and to show concern for other human beings, engaging in social interaction, empathy). 146 These are capabilities that are particularly fertile 147 and particularly fragile during childhood, and they depend (says Nussbaum) on the 'supporting forms of human association' (crucial for the development of emotions) and 'protecting institutions' ('that constitute and nourish affiliation'). 148 These are, in short, capabilities that for children are nurtured primarily by those carrying out the parental function within the 'protecting institution' of the family. This is not to ignore the reality that some parents do not do this well or that families can be places of harm for children; I am not claiming that this is the lived experience of all children. Rather, I am making a politically normative claim based on a general observation about the conditions within which children and young people thrive. Thus, taken together with the provision of the basic resources to protect the child's life and health, the fostering of these two capability-based interests -emotions and affiliation -I refer to as the child's 'right to be parented'. 
The Assumed Responsibility to Parent Incarcerated Children
The articulation of the child's 'right to be parented', with its conceptual basis derived from the (partial) citizenship status of children and its content founded in a capabilities approach, is crucial when it comes to examining the rights of children qua prisoner. This is because the restriction on the child's right to be parented that occurs as a result of imprisonment (the forced separation and prohibition of day-to-day contact necessarily prevents parents from meeting many of their child's physical, emotional and affiliative needs) is beyond the legitimate restriction of citizenship rights that occurs when we are punished as citizens. Limiting the child's private right to be parented disrupts the reciprocity of the accountability relationship, creating an 'obligations gap' where the duties owed to the child by the parent cannot be fulfilled.
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How then can the reciprocity be restored? One option would be to consider whether the protections afforded by Article 8 ECHR are sufficient to mitigate the impact on the ability of parents to fulfil their duties, for example by placing the child in secure accommodation close to her home and allowing frequent visits and phone calls. However, even if the proportionality scales were heavily weighted in favour of the parent-child relationship, it is nonetheless a qualified right that can be restricted.
Moreover, relying only on Article 8 fails to recognise adequately the child's differential citizenship status: this is not simply about protecting an existing relationship from state interference (as it is for adult prisoners or for the child's other relationships), it is about the differential source of the responsibility, a different type of right: duties are owed to children by their parents, whether these have been met in practice or not. The obligations gap' is not met by Article 8.
Instead, I wish to argue that reciprocity is restored when the State assumes responsibility to parent incarcerated children; a responsibility owed to all incarcerated children regardless of the quality of parenting they have previously enjoyed. To make this case we must return again to the inter-relationship between the political community and the child's 'private' right to be parented. It was noted above that where the limits of family freedom lie -the minimum standards required of parentsis properly a matter of public concern. But within those boundaries there is considerable freedom for parents to decide how to raise their children. In some circumstances, for example in the use of physical chastisement or in relation to restricting another's liberty, the State affords children less protection vis a vis their parents than is the case as between other citizens. This exemplifies a wider point: that children's exclusion from full participation within the polity, their lack of full citizenship rights, subjects them to decision-making that is potentially contrary to their interests as a group and which increases their vulnerability to the actions and decisions of others (potential physical harm, in relation to parental discipline for example). This occurs in other ways too. For example the limitation of social citizenship rights, including the right to work full-time, means that children are economically dependent on adults to feed, house, and clothe them, regardless of the child's own capability to do so. Thus, children's status as partial citizen means that they are uniquely vulnerable to the actions and decisions of others in a way that adults are not. require a political and economic commitment to restructure the juvenile secure estate.
Specifically, this duty requires the use of care-based homes for all incarcerated children.
The Case for Care-based Homes
The primary purpose of identifying the child's 'right to be parented' is to foreground the obligations owed by parents to their children: the element of children's rights that fills the space between their partial citizenship and the full citizenship rights that adults enjoy; a type of right that cannot legitimately be restricted by imprisonment. In determining the content of this right, I identified two of Nussbaum's central capabilities as especially important in childhood -emotions and affiliation -and which require 'supporting forms of human association' (usually primarily from parents) and institutions that 'constitute and nourish affiliation' (usually primarily within families). Where parents are unable or unavailable to nurture the child's affective/affiliative capabilities and the child is removed from the institution of the family, the State's assumed responsibility requires the provision of alternatives.
Specifically, I argue it requires the provision of caring relationships within a home.
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I draw attention in particular to 'home' because as a concept it captures much more than the mere provision of accommodation or shelter. Lorna Fox has described 'home' as 'housing + x', where the x factor encompasses intangible emotional, social, cultural, and psychological qualities such as security, reciprocity, identity, memories, privacy, and safety. 159 These are qualities that facilitate the development of emotions and affiliation in children, and their articulation helps us to understand the close relationship between home, parenting 160 and children's development and wellbeing.
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As a concept, 'home' has limited significance in English law. 162 Nonetheless the presence of children has, in some private law disputes, transformed a 'house' into a 158 This is an obligation that should be owed to all children and in England and Wales where the State intervenes in other contexts where parents are not fulfilling these duties (such as care and protection) then children are placed within either families (foster carers) or in children's care homes. 1996) . 160 Children themselves also recognise the nexus between parenting and home: see Allat (n 161). 161 See the review of the literature in Fox (n 159) ch 9. 162 Fox (n 159) 143.
'family home' worthy of special legal protection. 163 However, the legal recognition that home is central to children's lives that emerges in these cases is absent when considering the nature and function of juvenile secure accommodation.
There are crucial differences between the family home and a carceral home of course. Being placed in detention is a temporary condition (hopefully) for most children, so the stability and memory association may be less than in other types of home. Further, Hallden has found that for children an important part of the 'home' is its role as a place of safety to return to when exploring the outside, or the strange. 164 For children in custody, the 'home' in which they are accommodated is paradoxically both the outside world and the inside; it cannot therefore provide a haven from the 'strange'. Similarly, we may be cautious in advocating for 'homes' for detained children where the 'home' is a location of identity-development. 165 It is perhaps not, therefore, always possible or desirable to detain children in accommodation that embodies the wider qualities of a 'home'. Should we therefore reject as irrelevant the concept of a 'home' for detained children? I argue that we should not. This is because it is inevitable that any place a child lives will shape him in some way in terms of his memories, his identity, his self-worth, and his self-esteem, regardless of its quality or nature; just as it is likely that a child will form attachments to anyone meeting his basic needs. 166 This highlights the need to imbue these key conceptsparenting, care, and home -with positive normative values that can provide a basis for structuring the juvenile secure estate in a way that is consistent with the right of the child to be parented.
Although it is impossible to 'legislate for love' or provide for incarcerated children the type of parenting and home that the best families provide, it is possible to develop structures and institutions that are most likely to provide 'care' and 'home' in the positive, normative sense described above. To do so, the secure estate in England 176 Finally, the size of the colleges means there will be only a handful dispersed across the country, making the maintenance of existing family visits even harder since children are likely to be placed at great distances from home.
In addition to these three specific rights-based issues, the colleges are unlikely to be able to provide the sort of care-based homes required by the above analysis. 173 In existing small mixed children's homes, the boys are younger and greater efforts can be made to keep separate girls from boys with a history or risk of sexual violence. If there were many more small care-based homes, even greater protection could be afforded to girls through careful placement decisions. In contrast, a large institution with a high number of boys may be more prone to the development of a masculine culture that fosters harmful attitudes and behaviours towards girls. The lower staff-child ratio and the greater prevalence of violence more generally in larger institutions leaves girls especially at risk. 174 ibid, para 1.57. 175 R(C) v SSJ (n 11). 176 See the Government's spurious analysis of the decision in C (as set out in the Joint Committee's report, which is highly critical of this provision). 177 See eg Ministry of Justice (n 29) para 62, which made reference to welcoming 'innovative methods including those with a military ethos' and noted that '[w]e will not forget that a custodial sentence is a punishment, and often essential for the protection of the public. When located within the framework set out in this article, it seems that Secure
Colleges will be concerned with fulfilling the State's obligations to the child as citizen. Like the adult offender, the child is constructed as a conditional citizen who must be reformed in order to be integrated back in to the citizenry and the Government hopes that Secure Colleges will provide a better context than YOIs for this to be achieved. This is an important element of the reciprocity that is owed to the child qua citizen, qua prisoner, to help her avoid future reoffending and to be integrated (back) into the citizenry. But Secure Colleges only partially meet the reciprocity necessary in relation to incarcerated children. The current proposals fail to recognise that the child's status as demi citizen leaves a conceptual (and sometimes empirical) space that is filled by the child's right to be parented, and that the parental 178 Liebling and Crewe's critique of managerialism (n 94) 300-01 applies across the contemporary prison sector, in smaller prisons as well as larger institutions. However, it would appear to apply with force to bigger institutions where there is a larger staff and a greater distance between the managers (Governors or 'principals'), the staff and the inmates, and thus where reliance on 'tick box' managerialism is even greater because alternative cultural approaches for informal accountability may be more difficult to foster. In the context of my argument (for care homes rather than YOIs/secure colleges) it should be noted that children's homes are regulated under the Children Act and not the Prison Act. 179 See again Whitty (n 84). responsibility to fulfil that right is assumed by the state when the child is incarcerated.
To meet that responsibility, the proposals for reform need to be re-focused to better set out how they will provide incarcerated children with caring relationships within accommodation that captures the 'x factors' of the 'home'. However, it is unlikely that this can be achieved within the current proposals; a fundamental rethink is therefore required.
Concluding Comments
Writing in the context of 'special care' in Finland, Pösö et al have argued that the use of closed institutions based on care, nurture, and education requires 'a particular socio-cultural understanding of children, young people, problems and the role of public authorities, as well as of the interrelations between these'. 182 They note that in Finland this understanding is evident from the 'wide provision of social services to children and families with children which are universally available'.
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Our preference for punitive, control-based models of punishment and imprisonment can in contrast be seen as a reflection of our own particular socio-cultural understanding of children, located within the pervasive neo-liberal model of responsibility and individual choice that regards children who commit the most serious offences as mature, responsible, and deserving of a penal regime that punishes rather than cares.
184
In this type of socio-cultural context the argument I have developed here -that the state has an assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated children -is subject to critique on the basis of 'less eligibility': an incarcerated child should not receive an advantage from her (chosen) criminal offending -a 'right to be parented' and placed in a care-based home -when other 'non-blameworthy' children may be living in worse homes with very poor or no parenting. However, this criticism can be met in two ways. The first is simply to refute a neo-liberal approach to punishment and to argue that children -even more so that adults -do not 'choose' to offend but are limited by circumstance and deserve support and not (just) punishment. Secondly, and less controversially, the right for incarcerated minors is one that children outside of the secure estate also should and do have. rather, it reflects the value we place on parental freedom to decide how to raise their children and also recognises that State actors require greater regulation than parents because (in general) they are less likely to act within the bonds of love.
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The purpose of this article is not, therefore, to argue for extra rights for detained children, but to provide a conceptual framework to show why an existing (but so far unarticulated) type of children's right -a child's right to be parentedcontinues to be owed to the child when he is detained, why this right is assumed by the state, and why it should be used to shape the juvenile secure estate. Specifically, the assumed responsibility to parent incarcerated children gives rise to a further right:
the right to be placed in a care-based home and not a penal institution. By conceptualising the rights of incarcerated children through a citizenship lens, an argument could be made that all incarcerated minors, regardless of vulnerability and
